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Great Bear Hunt
One has to admit to a sneaking regard for the Russian president and prime minister. Western governments have condemned Moscow's invasion of Georgia in terms ranging from the strongest possible to mild rebuke, but it has become increasingly clear that there is next to nothing the west can do - or wants to do - about the resurgent Russia.
Typically, these mini-wars kick off when your correspondents are on holiday. Just as Israel and Hezbollah battled in Lebanon in July 2006, Georgia and Russia fought a short, dirty war this summer. The timing might have been similar, but the results were very different. Who "won" the Lebanon war - if anyone - is still being debated. But Russia crushed Georgia's forces, and set up camp well within the borders of the Georgia, within a matter of days.
The rights and wrongs of this war, and its parallels with the creation of the state of Kosovo, have been discussed elsewhere. What it means for European and western unity, however, could remain ambiguous long after a result for the Israel-Hizbollah war is settled.
Indeed, despite Russia's apparent overwhelming win, some commentators wondered if Russia was really that strong. We've seen reports that Georgian forces did more damage than the media has suggested; we read one column by a respected historian in August which argued that the war showed Russian weakness, rather than strength.
EURSOC can't find the column, for now, but the author criticised Russia's creaky artillery, ancient tanks and poorly-trained soldiers, suggesting that Moscow couldn't fight a bigger war.
But who wants Russia to fight a bigger war? And with whom? And aren't western forces struggling too, against troops much more poorly equipped than the Georgians, who enjoy training and equipment supplied by the best of the west?
And besides, it's all very well to argue from some university chair that Russian forces are outdated and inefficient, but who's just won their war, and quickly - and will choose their moment to leave Georgia at their own pace? Frankly, there's nothing the west can do to budge Russia out of what was once Georgia. Furthermore, the Russian parliament's recognition of independence for Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia may have been widely condemned and "illegal" in international terms (whatever that may mean these days) but the Russian's have a response to that too - the west's creation, this year, of Kosovo, despite assurances that Serbia's territorial integrity would be respected.
Moscow has judged the international mood with some skill. No-one in their right mind wants to start world war three over Georgia; Russia's allies, such as they are, can point to a previous "wrong" on behalf of the west via Kosovo. Thanks to Europe's energy dependence on Russia, EU nations cannot agree on how best to respond to the invasion of Georgia:
Vladimir Putin said he didn't see any evidence of concrete steps being taken to punish Russia, and
“If any of the European countries wants to serve someone’s narrow political interests, then go ahead. We cannot stop them. But we think, as they say in such cases, ‘You have to look out for No1’...
“I think that many of our partners, and first of all our European partners, will be guided by this fairly crude but very descriptive saying,” he added.
He's judged the European mood superbly: Those eastern European states which were once unwilling Russian satellites (and which have ethnically Russian populations) are understandably terrified, not least because they've spent much of the past decade thumbing their noses at their former imperial masters. Their hopes of a severe EU response have been snubbed by those nations who want to take an easier line on Moscow, such as Germany and Italy (Silvio Berlusconi is a close friend of Putin's).
France's Nicolas Sarkozy, who took the credit for a peace agreement settled once the Russians had completed their mission, is using France's six-month EU Presidency to try to strike a balance between the hardline east and the softer response in "Old Europe." Despite claims from Paris, few seriously believe that Sarkozy's diplomacy had any real effect on Russia. They stopped when they had finished, and that was that.
(Indeed, this reminds us of the response of one of our Polish friends a few years ago to French-led plans for an EU Army. He was dismissive, claiming that the Poles could never rely on their European "allies" to protect them from Russian aggression: Only the US could do that, he said. In those days, Russia and the US were pals; Islamist terrorism was the greatest threat, and to hear a Pole fret about Moscow sounded unrealistic and quaint. How things change!)
And then, the spectacle of Britain's PM lecturing Moscow on its "naked aggression" how sovereign states should not be invaded... one can't blame the Russians for greeting that one with derision.
It could be said that Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev judged the mood in the UK, too. Despite the outrage sounded by Gordon Brown and foreign secretary David Miliband, there is little evidence that the average Brit wants anything to do with punishing Russia for what many seem to believe was a spectacular error by Georgia's government. Poke the bear and if it savages you, what do you expect? runs the response on the comments pages, if not the leader columns. Should Russia start defending its interests and citizens in the Ukraine or Estonia the mood might change, but for now it's firmly pro-Russian, which the pro-West Georgians must despair of.
Even allowing for the fact that EURSOC's experience has shown that any report on Russia, critical or otherwise, draws many responses from fiercely pro-Moscow "English" readers with dubious IP addresses, the feeling that we are in no position to lecture or punish Russia for "taking care of business", no matter how unpleasantly, seems widespread. Indeed, there are more than a few Brits who positively welcome Moscow's contribution to the world's new multipolarity.
The question is whether the division, apathy and grudging support from the west emboldens the Russians to broaden their recapture of old territories. Moscow's response has been ambiguous. First, it said its mission was complete with the subjugation of Georgia, but days later Medvedev said Russia would do the same for ethnic Russians anywhere in the nation's sphere of influence.
